Temporary Migration in Theories of International Mobility of Labour by Katarzyna Budnik
Warsaw 2011
Temporary Migration in Theories
of International Mobility of Labour
Katarzyna B. Budnik








National Bank of Poland 
Education and Publishing Department 
00-919 Warszawa, 11/21 Świętokrzyska Street 
phone: +48 22 653 23 35, fax +48 22 653 13 21
© Copyright by the National Bank of Poland, 2011
http://www.nbp.pl
Katarzyna B. Budnik – National Bank of Poland, e-mail: katarzyna.budnik@nbp.plContents













2 Theories of Migration 7
2.1 Microeconomic Theories of Migration ..................... 7
2.2 Theories of Migration Working on Higher Aggregation Level ........ 9
2.3 Perpetuation of Migration ........................... 12
3 Migration in International Trade Models 14
4 Return Migration 19
5 Remittances 24
6 Temporary migration 30
7 Conclusions 33
List of Tables
1 Theories of international migration ...................... 7
2 Microeconomic theories of international migration .............. 8
3 Theories of international migration focusing on higher aggregation level .. 11
4 Theories of perpetuation of international migration ............. 12
5 Migration in international trade models .................... 15
6 Motives for return migration .......................... 19
7 Motives for sending remittances ........................ 26
2
1   Introduction
2   Theories of Migration
  2.1  Microeconomic Theories of Migration
  2.2  Theories of Migration Working on Higher Aggregation Level
  2.3  Theories of Migration Working on Higher Aggregation Level
3   Migration in International Trade Models
4   Return Migration
5   Remittances
6   Temporary migration
7   Conclusions
 Perpetuation of MigrationList of Tables










2 Theories of Migration 7
2.1 Microeconomic Theories of Migration ..................... 7
2.2 Theories of Migration Working on Higher Aggregation Level ........ 9
2.3 Perpetuation of Migration ........................... 12
3 Migration in International Trade Models 14
4 Return Migration 19
5 Remittances 24
6 Temporary migration 30
7 Conclusions 33
List of Tables
1 Theories of international migration ...................... 7
2 Microeconomic theories of international migration .............. 8
3 Theories of international migration focusing on higher aggregation level .. 11
4 Theories of perpetuation of international migration ............. 12
5 Migration in international trade models .................... 15
6 Motives for return migration .......................... 19
7 Motives for sending remittances ........................ 26
2
1   Theories of international migration
2   Microeconomic theories of international migration
3   Theories of international migration focusing on higher  aggregation level
4   Theories of perpetuation of international migration
5   Migration in international trade models
6   Motives for return migration
7   Motives for sending remittancesAbstract
WORKING PAPER No. 89 5




There is an increasing awareness of an empirical relevance of temporary migration.
This literature overview attempts to summarize the current state of knowledge about
drivers and economic role of temporary migration. It sets together elements of rel-
evant theories of initiation, perpetuation and return migration, international trade
and conclusions from a growing body of empirical literature on returns, remittances
and behaviour of immigrants in host economies, including labour markets. Distin-
guishing between permanent and temporary migration may help to explain not only
the dynamics of the actual labour force movements but also to better describe their
impact on source and host economies.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F22, J61
Keywords: temporary migration, migration theory, return migration, remittances
∗National Bank of Poland. E-mail: Katarzyna.Budnik@nbp.pl.Introduction
National Bank of Poland 6
1
1 Introduction
Temporary migration makes up for a signiﬁcant share of actual and historical cross-borders
labour relocations. Hatton and Williamson (2006, ch. 5) date a transition between migra-
tion of a dominantly permanent to an increasingly temporary character to the beginning
of XX century, when cost of travel were already substantially reduced. They argue that
a decade before 1914 returning emigrants amounted to one third of immigrant wave to
the United States. The post II World War evidence robustly conﬁrm an important role
of temporary migration, and especially so, in Europe (Baines, 1994, and Dustmann et al.,
1996b). At least initially, most of immigrants have an intention to return to a country
of origin. Nekby (2006) provides evidence that over 70% of migrants who entered Swe-
den intended to return. The return intention (within 10 years from 1983) was shared by
over 55% of immigrants to Germany, as showed by Dustmann (1993). A high fraction
of immigrants indeed depart from a host country. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) estimate
that 17.5% of immigrants who arrived to the United States between January 1975 and
March 1980 left the country by the end of that period. Aydemir and Robinson (2008)
calculate that around 35% of immigrants left Canada within 20 years from the time of
entry. According to Dumont and Spielvogel (2008) the average re-emigration rate in 5
years after an arrival to a country varied from 60.4% for immigrants to Ireland to 28.2%
to the Netherlands (and 19.1% to the U.S.). Klinthall (1999) reports that around one
third of immigrants to Sweden left the country within ﬁve years from their arrival and
ﬁfty percent within ten years (between 1968-1993). Dustmann and Weiss (2007) docu-
ment that only 60% of male and 68% female immigrants stay after ﬁve initial years from
an arrival to Britain and intra-European movers have one of the highest propensities to
re-migrate.
At the same time, economic literature surprisingly rarely distinguishes between tem-
porary and permanent migration. Therefore, this article tries to address the gap between
the acknowledged empirical relevance of and the deﬁcient literature on temporary migra-
tion. In doing so, it provides an overview of existing theories and empirical studies which
may improve our understanding of drivers and macroeconomic consequences of temporary
labour movements. The overview has two major composites. The ﬁrst is a stock-taking
exercise summarizing research outcomes on migration, which can apply in cases when
migration has a non-permanent character. The second is a collection of arguments sup-
porting the claim that identiﬁcation of migration movements as dominantly temporary or
permanent, matters for a correct assessment of their impact on host and source economies.
In this review, temporary migration is broadly understood as a movement of an in-
dividual across national borders involving a change of her actual place of residence1 and
1Change of residence sets temporary migrants aside from international commuters. For an empirical
comparison of both types of mobility on the example of Mexican workers see for example Kossoudji and
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in sociology or political sciences. In economics itself, migration is studied in contexts
ranging from growth theory (Drinkwater et al., 2003, provide an exhaustive survey of
this literature including the role of migration in endogenous growth models), theory of
public choice (Gerdes and Wadensjo, 2008, are one of the recent examples) to demo-
graphics and public ﬁnance (see e.g. Tosun, 2009). In the overview, I focus mostly
on subject-relevant economic literature and within it, I explicate aspects of endogenously
driven temporary migration interrelated with medium run dynamics of labour markets and
economies. Consequently, I abstract from migration tied predominantly to non-economic
drivers as refugees migration, and treat legal and illegal migration jointly.
Narrowing the focus to medium run economic aspects of temporary migration, does
not help to overcome a problem that (in economics) temporary migration started to be
distinguished as a separate phenomenon only very recently. Other than that, the same
theories that detach from discussion of issues speciﬁc to temporary or permanent mi-
gration, are themselves diverse, scattered along diﬀerent ﬁelds and as such occasionally
incoherent. As Massey et al. (1994, pp. 700-701) put it more than a decade ago: Social
scientists do not approach the study of immigration from a shared paradigm, but from
a variety of competing theoretical viewpoints fragmented across disciplines, regions, and
ideologies. As a result, research on the subject tends to be narrow, ineﬃcient, and charac-
terized by duplication, miscommunication, reinvention, and bickering about fundamentals.
Earlier, Massey et al. (1993, pp. 432) conclude: At present, there is no single, coherent
theory of international migration, only a fragmented set of theories that have developed
largely in isolation from one another, sometimes but not always segmented by disciplinary
boundaries.
Next, data limitations and, partially related, a dominant focus on host country per-
spective4 contributed to uneven development of migration theory. Finally, most of works
on migration applies a partial equilibrium approach. That may cause problems when
comparing conclusions from diﬀerent studies.
In the ﬁrst section, I start with summarizing literature on economic determinants of
international migration. I follow closely a review of migration theories and empirical
studies (for the U.S.) by Massey et al. (1993, 1994)5. After them, I distinguish two pillars
of the analysis: theories of initiation of migration and theories of its perpetuation. Later, I
discuss a role of migration in international trade models. International trade models oﬀer
a general equilibrium insight in a medium- to long-run consequences of cross-border labour
4Apart from greater availability of data on immigration than on emigration, higher interest in eﬀects
of migration on host economies is also tied to the fact that most research on the subject is still conducted
in developed, migration receiving countries.
5A literature overview by Massey et al.(1993, 1994) identiﬁes major streams of migration theory. A
broader, but also less in depth than in Massey et al., review of migration theories is provided by e.g.
Bijak et al. (2004), Bijak (2006), Hagen-Zanker (2008).
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with an intention to return to a country of origin2. The actual residence signiﬁes a place
to live, where a person normally spends her period of rest and which enables her to supply
work on a local labour market on an ongoing basis. This deﬁnition of residence serves
the purpose of integrating all cross-border movements of workers but stays abroad for
very short periods only (days, weeks). It is conceptually very similar to more commonly
used statistical deﬁnition of usual residence. For the purpose of the overview, the latter
deﬁnition seems to be too restrictive in terms of a duration of stay abroad required be-
fore an immigrant can be counted as a resident of a host country (the United Nations
recommendation is 12 months).
The deﬁnition of a temporary migrant underlines her plans and intentions rather than
ex post assessment of her actual duration of a stay abroad. This interpretation follows
closely intuition of Dustmann (1996b)3. These are plans and intentions are likely to
shape behaviour of a migrant when staying abroad, e.g. emigrants planning to move only
temporarily can be expected to maintain closer ties to the source country, family, friends,
local labour and goods markets etc. then those who attempt to stay abroad permanently.
As empirically a share of unintended returns and stays is signiﬁcant (an evaluation of
predictive power of intentions of return is presented for Western Germany by Dustmann,
1996b, for Sweden by Klinthall, 1995, and a dependence of return intentions on years
already spend abroad i.e. by Steiner and Velling, 1992) the distinction between actual
and planned duration of stay abroad is not only verbal. In practice, the preferred deﬁnition
of a temporary migrant as a person who attempts to return for a signiﬁcant period during
her stay abroad, is cannot be always very restrictively applied. It is especially true while
reviewing empirical literature on return migration as most of returnees are identiﬁed only
ex post.
Selecting theoretical and empirical literature on temporary migration is a challeng-
ing task. Elements of migration research are present not only in economics but also
Ranney (1984).
2Dustmann and Weiss (2007) prefer to subclassify temporary migration into return, contract, circula-
tory and transistent migration. The understanding of temporary migration followed here, encompasses
return and contract migration. I silently assume that the behaviour of return and contract migrants,
whose length of stay abroad is endogenously and exogenously determined, respectively, is suﬃciently
similar. Circulatory migration (when migrant worker move frequently between the host and the source
country) is rather treated as a special case of repeated temporary migration. Transistent migrants, whose
stay in a foreign country before reaching other destination, are believed to be driven by similar incentives
as native emigrants. For discussion of motives of temporary and onward migrants see e.g. DaVanzo
(1976), Neckby (2006).
3Eade et al. (2006), who survey Polish immigrants in the U.K., next to immigrants who plan to stay
in the U.K. for a short period of time only (whom they label either storks or hamsters) and those who
intend to stay permanently (stayers), distinguish a category of searchers – namely immigrants who keep
both options, of staying and returning, open. However, taking possibility of return into account searchers
are likely to be (possibly weaker than stork or hamsters) interested in their position at home. In line
with interpretation of migration presented here they should be counted as temporary migrants.
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mobility. Beyond that, they put migration of workers in a broader context of mobility
of any production factors. Important to state, the reviewed migration and international
trade theories do not explicitly separate temporary from permanent labour movements.
The third and the fourth sections, compile motives of return migration and of sending
remittances. The theoretical arguments discussed in these sections are supplemented
with key empirical evidence supporting or speaking against them. Only then, in the
ﬁfth section, I turn to a joint evaluation of collected concepts and empirical outcomes in
respect to their potential to explain workings and eﬀects of temporary migration. The
same section also summarizes results which speak for diﬀerent behaviour of temporary
and permanent migrants. The ﬁnal section concludes.
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mobility. Beyond that, they put migration of workers in a broader context of mobility
of any production factors. Important to state, the reviewed migration and international
trade theories do not explicitly separate temporary from permanent labour movements.
The third and the fourth sections, compile motives of return migration and of sending
remittances. The theoretical arguments discussed in these sections are supplemented
with key empirical evidence supporting or speaking against them. Only then, in the
ﬁfth section, I turn to a joint evaluation of collected concepts and empirical outcomes in
respect to their potential to explain workings and eﬀects of temporary migration. The
same section also summarizes results which speak for diﬀerent behaviour of temporary
and permanent migrants. The ﬁnal section concludes.
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2 Theories of Migration
Table 1: Theories of international migration
Microeconomic Higher level of aggregation
Initiation of migration Perpetuation of migration
New economics of migration





Source: Based on Massey et al. (1993).
Theories of international migration can be subdivided into ones with a micro and a
higher aggregation level perspective. Table 1 classiﬁes single theories discussed in the
section according to level of the analysis, separating between theories of initiation and
perpetuation of migration. Microeconomic theories look at migration as an outcome
of decisions of single subjects – individuals or households. Theories taking a higher
aggregation level view, including macroeconomic theories, link migration to forces at
work on a national or the world economy level. They do not rule out that there are some
microeconomic mechanisms which facilitate migration ﬂows, but they put more emphasis
on interdependencies between individual migration decisions.
2.1 Microeconomic Theories of Migration
Microeconomic theories are shortly summarized in Table 2. The table, same as Tables
3 and 4, contains also a brief comparison of explicit or silent assumptions about utility
functions and functioning of markets, underlying the theories.
The neoclassical theory of migration originates in works of Sjaastad (1962) and To-
daro (1969). The authors indicate at the expected income gain as the main driver of
international migration. An individual decides to emigrate when the expected stream
of income to be earned abroad net of migration costs (monetary and non pecuniary) is
higher than the expected discounted value of income at home. The expected income gain
depends on a worker’s education or experience, returns to skills at host and home labour
markets, costs of living and the probability of ﬁnding employment in diﬀerent locations.
The theory assumes that all markets clear. However, heterogeneity of workers, diﬀerent
returns to their skills and diﬀerences between individual migration costs may lead to the
existence of the equilibrium wage diﬀerential between locations. Consequently also the
absence of the average wage level diﬀerentials between two economies does not exclude
migration ﬂows.
7Theories of Migration
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This approach to describe migration movements is often referred to as a human capital
theory. The name reﬂects that within the framework, workers consider migration when
they expect either to reap higher returns on their existing skills in a foreign country or
on skills to be acquired abroad in a home country (e.g. via occupational upgrading),
after a return. Approval of the relevance of migrants’ selection is reﬂected in a rich body
of empirical studies on the subject. Starting with works of Borjas (1985) and Chiswick
(1986) who look at an impact of compositional eﬀects (changes in a distribution of skills of
immigrants) on evolution of the average earnings of immigrants in the U.S. Borjas (1987)
develops a fully-ﬂedged model of the selectivity of migrants (applicable on macroeconomic
level) where higher dispersion of wages in a host country (as compared to source regions)
favours immigration of highly skilled and motivated workers. The reverse holds true when
wage dispersion in a host country is trimmed either by labour market institutions or ﬁscal
policy measures.
Table 2: Microeconomic theories of international migration
Level of
analysis Motive Destination choice Markets Utility
Neoclassical migration theory










(e.g. for skilled and
unskilled).
Cost of migration between
labour markets (monetary
and non pecuniary); all
markets clear.
Standard.
New economics of migration

























Source: Based on Massey et al. (1993) with own additions.
The New Economics of Migration (NEM), set on by Stark and Bloom (1985), ac-
knowledges the incompleteness of insurance and capital markets and views migration as
a measure to overcome it. The NEM underlines the importance of joint decision mak-
ing within a family and treats household, not individuals, as a basic unit of an analysis.
Migration might be e.g. aimed at diﬀerentiating sources of a family’s income and not at
maximization of a migrants’ own earnings, if a household cannot insure against its income
8
volatility otherwise.
Second, the NEM indicates at the relative deprivation as the next plausible migration
trigger. If a utility function of an individual (household) incorporates not only absolute
but also relative income, migration may be encouraged by income inequality in a source
country. In the setting, foreign earnings allow an emigrant to increase her prestige at
home. The NEM does not deny that expected income diﬀerentials play a signiﬁcant role
in driving migration movements. It only argues that other factors, like market failures,
altruistic or cultural linkages between family members or a relative deprivation, might be
of similar importance.
2.2 Theories of Migration Working on Higher Aggregation Level
A short overview of theories assessing migration on the level of economies or nations
is oﬀered in Table 3. The neoclassical macrotheories descend from the research on the
sources of economic development. Harris and Todaro (1970) explicate a theory of rural-
urban migration as a process leading to equilibration of regional labour markets. The
same mechanism can be successfully used to assess dynamics of international migration.
In labour abundant countries wages are low but they are high in labour scarce markets.
This sets incentives for workers to move to from regions with a labour supply glut to
countries with deﬁcient labour. Migration balances labour demand and supply in source
and host countries so that the international wage diﬀerential reﬂects only the cost of
international movements.
The dual labour market theory, pioneered by Piore (1979), focuses on the whole econ-
omy as a basic unit of the analysis. According to the theory, the primary reason for
migration lies in segmentation of host countries’ labour markets. In developed economies,
the primary sector oﬀers stable employment, high wages and social prestige. Even though,
access to these jobs may be rationed e.g. by high educational requirements or longer ap-
prenticeship periods, nationals strictly prefer employment in primary than in secondary
sector.
At the same time, a range of institutional ,,rigidities” prevents employers from attract
native workers to secondary sector jobs or makes their attempts just ineﬃcient. An
increase in secondary sector wages can disrupt hierarchy of social prestige, and therefore
it sets on a process of wage adjustments in an economy. Wage adjustments occasionally
lead to restoration of initial relative wages. Wage signals can also have very limited impact
on motivation of native workers who attach high value to the social prestige of a job.
Migrants, in turn, may have diﬀerent reference groups than nationals who could be
employed at similar jobs. Earnings in secondary sector may allow migrants to increase
their status in a home country – which may be their primary concern. Hence to ﬁll
9Theories of Migration
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bottlenecks in the secondary sector proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms would turn to foreigners who
are willing to take jobs with lower prestige, income and lower security. As such, migration
is a purely demand driven phenomenon tied to a limited supply of native workers in the
secondary sector.
10Theories of Migration
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2
The world system theory (Wallerstein, 1974) perceives migration as a natural outcome
of globalization. International integration of trade and production processes, technolog-
ical progress that facilitates reduction of communication and transport costs and the
development of a global culture – they all disturb traditional social norms, technologies,
and create labour oversupply in developing countries. Simultaneously these processes fa-
cilitate entry of citizens of peripheral areas into labour markets of developed countries.
The abundance of labour and the reduction of migration costs jointly trigger outﬂows of
labour from catching-up regions.
2.3 Perpetuation of Migration
Theories of perpetuation of migration, set together in Table 4, put emphasis on interac-
tions between current and potential migrants. The network and institutional theories refer
to the existence of networks (Taylor, 1986) or institutions which support migration via
acceleration of information ﬂows and, indirectly, reduction of migration costs. The theory
of cumulative causation concentrates in turn on evolution of socio-economic environment
in source economies (Massey, 1990). Changes in the distribution of wealth triggered by
inﬂow of remittances to home countries, labour-saving innovations introduced by emi-
grants in agriculture or positive social value attached to mobility encourage new workers
to move abroad.
12
Table 4: Theories of perpetuation of international migration
Channel Mechanism Markets Implicit micro driver Push/pull
Network theory
Networks Networks constitute
a form of social
capital that people
can draw upon to
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3 Migration in International Trade Models
International trade theories attempt to answer a question why there is a trade between
countries. They are not designed to address a subjects related to labour migration,
but still they place labour mobility into a general equilibrium framework, and facilitate
understanding of general macroeconomic and labour market outcomes following migratory
waves.
Neoclassical international trade theories assesses labour migration as a phenomenon
similar to mobility of any other factor of production. In line with the neoclassical view,
preferences of migrants and natives do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer and individuals, if anything,
are silently assumed to relocate permanently. The only eﬀect of migration is shifting of
labour supplies in source and host markets.
The neoclassical trade theory is grounded on works of David Ricardo (1821), who
argues that countries can beneﬁt from international trade when there are diﬀerences in
production technology between them. Technologies describe eﬃciency of production in
terms of required factor inputs to manufacture a single good. A comparative advantage
in production of a good appears in a country, when the good can be produced at a lower
cost than other goods in this economy, as compared to any other country. Countries will
export goods where they have the comparative advantage in production and import goods
they produce less eﬃciently. The Ricardian theory is silent on the sources of comparative
advantage – countries’ technologies are assumed to given and ﬁxed.
The Ricardo’s concept is based on a principle that all factors of production, including
labour, are internationally immobile. In the simplest framework, where unit costs of
production are constant, relocation of labour, even if it would be exogenously imposed,
would not aﬀect relative prices or trade patterns. However, the Ricardian theory sets on
a range of assumptions which carry over to neoclassical models with possibility of factors
migration, such as competitive clearing-up markets and low (zero) transport costs. Thus,
the Ricardian trade theories start a list of theories relevant for migration studies in Table
5.
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Two international trade models extensively used to assess consequences of migration
are the ,,basic” model built along the lines proposed by Ramaswami (1968) and the
Heckscher-Ohlin model. As compared to Ricardo and Ricardo-Viener models they link
countries’ comparative advantages not to exogenous technology diﬀerences but to factor
endowments. Similarly to classical models, they assume absence of any transport costs
and instantaneous clearing of factor markets (including labour markets). In both models
ﬁrms constantly make the best possible use of available resources, so inﬂow or outﬂow of
labour induces changes in production (its size and/or product mix). Free movement of
production factors and goods raises the world income. In fact, within these frameworks,
migration substitutes for free movement of capital and goods 7. The gains from mobility
of production factors or international trade are shared between natives of all involved
countries.
The two models diﬀer in their assumptions about the production structure. In the
Ramaswami model there is only one type of tradable good, whereas in the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, a variety of export goods. The diverse assumptions about number of produced
goods imply slightly diﬀerent eﬀects of cross-border labour relocation. In the Ramaswami
approach increased abundance of labour on a local market reduces wages of workers
competing for jobs with immigrants. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model higher labour supply
in the ﬁrst place induces a shift in the production structure in the direction of producing
more of labour intensive goods (Rybczynski theorem). The negative impact on wages of
natives takes place only when the magnitude of an increase in the world supply of labour
intensive good is suﬃciently large to reduce its world price (Stolper-Samuelson theorem).
Hence, the correction of wages in the aftermath of a migration wave is absent or at least
moderated in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model provides an elegant answer to the empirical wage-migration
puzzle, namely resistance of wages to an increase in labour supply tied to immigration.
For this reason it is believed to have a strong empirical advantage over the ,,basic” model
(Gaston and Nelson, 2000). However the restraint response of wages to immigration in
the Heckscher-Ohlin model is tied to assumed holding of the factor price equalization.
The substitutability outcomes, between labour migration, trade, and capital move-
ments (similarly as the related welfare implications), break down in the Heckscher-Ohlin
model in the presence of ﬁxed production factors (see Kuhn and Wooton, 1987, for rela-
tion between migration and capital, and Venables, 1997, for relation between migration
and trade). Hence, predictions of the model can be misleading if there are persistent
diﬀerences in technology, business environment or infrastructure between regions. Similar
conclusion can be reached when there are diverse labour market institutions in receiving
and sending countries (Saavadra-Rivano and Wooton, 1983). Next, the postulated relation
7In the Heckscher-Ohlin framework a substitution result was ﬁrst derived by Mundell (1957).
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between trade, capital and labour mobility does not apply when workers are ﬁnancially
constraint. In this case trade or capital liberalization leading to an increase of the average
income of workers (and an improvement of the average education level) contributes to an
increase in the pool of potential emigrants (Lopez and Shiﬀ, 1998).
Further, the substitutability between capital, trade and migration evaporates in the
presence of increasing returns to scale. This point is made by the New Economic Geog-
raphy (Krugman, 1979). Decreasing average costs of production can lead to a situation
when wages (and returns to emigration to the destination) are highest in places which
oﬀer also signiﬁcant returns to capital. Economics of agglomerations can explain why
migration inﬂows induce inﬂow of capital or the reverse. Reduction of the average costs
of production resulting from clustering of capital and labour can facilitate (not dampen)
trade exchange with other regions8.
The complementarity between trade and migration is also consistent with the search
theory of trade. Rauch (1996) describes international exchange as taking place on markets
with imperfect information where buyers and sellers trade in heterogeneous products. In a
setting with informational frictions, migrants may possess a valuable advantage in a form
of a better knowledge about goods traded on host- and source markets. Provided that
consumers and traders are driven by the ideal product or love-for-variety motive, migration
facilitates trade exchange between source and host economies (in both directions). Still,
the theory does not attempt to answer why there is migration between markets, but
focuses solely on its impact on the trade exchange.
The arguments undermining applicability of neoclassical trade models to explain fac-
tual developments, and in particular adjustment of economies to migratory waves, are
every now and then supported by empirical evidence. Leontief (1953) documents that
even though the U.S. economy was relatively capital abundant in the late 40s, it exported
primary labour intensive goods. He attributes that outcome to what would be later la-
belled institutional environment or human capital endowment of labour force, suggesting
a failure of a simple two factors model to explain trade patterns9. Olson (1996) pro-
vides evidence against substitutability of trade, migration and capital integration in the
presence of diﬀerent labour market arrangements between countries. A signiﬁcant degree
of complementarity between trade and labour ﬂows is supported by even richer set of
studies. Head and Ries (1998), Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) show that immigration
tends to lead to increases in the intensity of trade exchange and especially in imports
8The New Economic Geography framework extended for expectation eﬀects or labour market frictions
were successfully used by Brezis and Krugman (1993) and Epifani and Gancia (2005), respectively, to
study migration movements and their eﬀect of host and sending economies.
9Leontief (1953) attempts to test Ricardian model. His logic of application the original Ricardo’s model
to study relative advantages goes exactly along the lines suggested by Heckschel and Ohlin (looking for
the sources of technological advantages in factor endowments).
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to a host country. Gould (1994) indicates that the complementarity relation between
trade and migration seems to be particularly strong for consumer goods10. Shiﬀ (1996)
reviews empirical literature supporting importance of ﬁnancial constraints for explaining
of dynamics of migration.
Criticism of the substitutability result appears also in literature focusing on social
aspects of higher immigration intensity. Card et al. (2009) focus on empirical relevance
of compositional amenities, namely subjective values ascribed by natives to maintaining
shared religious beliefs, language, and customs, and their potential to shape public opinion
about immigration. Natives’ fears about the impact of migration on social integrity may,
in turn, inﬂuence immigration policy and eﬃciency of use of the additional labour force
e.g. via discriminatory practices at a workplace. When integration of capital markets or
foreign trade are more broadly accepted in a society, the realized gains from these two
dimensions of integration may be signiﬁcantly higher than from encouraging an inﬂow of
foreign labour force.
10Other works documenting positive relation between migration and trade include Helliwell (1999),
Rauch and Trindade (2002), Blanes (2005), White (2007) and Foad (2009).
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to study relative advantages goes exactly along the lines suggested by Heckschel and Ohlin (looking for
the sources of technological advantages in factor endowments).
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between trade, capital and labour mobility does not apply when workers are ﬁnancially
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4 Return Migration
The two previous sections deal mainly with mechanisms that promote and reinforce migra-
tion between regions. This section evaluates theories that strive to identify determinants
of durations of stay abroad, once the decision to emigrate was taken. These theories
address the issue of permanency or temporariness of migration experience. Conceptually,
returns are by no way a phenomenon which can separated from initiation of migration.
The literature exploring why returns occur, appeared generally later than ﬁrst discussions
on reasons of initiation or perpetuation of migration, creating its own vocabulary, puzzles
and methods of empirical investigation.
Table 6: Motives for return migration
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Table 6 orders motives of return migration by theories that nest them. A return to
a home country can be assessed as an event within a (ﬁnite) life-cycle of a utility max-
imizing individual. The microeconomic life-cycle perspective suggests that individuals
choose their length of stay abroad so that their marginal beneﬁt from higher accumulated
savings equates marginal cost of working abroad. More detailed discussion concerns mo-
tives underlying returns, namely factors that aﬀect marginal beneﬁts and costs of staying
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abroad.
The basic motive for returning, initially raised by Berg (1961), Hill (1987), Djajic and
Milbourne (1988), is a preference for home country location. It starts with an assump-
tion that workers strongly prefer to remain in their community of origin, but resort to
temporary migration because of limited income opportunities. Dustmann (1996, 2003)
adds two further motives: diﬀerences in purchasing power of immigrants’ earnings in a
host- and home country, and higher returns to human capital acquired abroad in a source
country. Lindstrom (1996) and Mesnard (2004) point at incentives related to home coun-
try capital market imperfections. If there is limited access to credit or the local currency
is highly instable, workers can migrate to save enough to overcome the minimum invest-
ment threshold. In line with this view, migrants return when they accumulated suﬃcient
capital to start entrepreneurial activity.
The life-cycle theory is sometimes distinguished from the target income theory. Both
approaches have a lot in common, however the target income approach puts greater
emphasis on a target savings level than equating of marginal gains and cost of migration.
The target income theory embark on home bias in migrants preferences. Thus, optimally
migrants would prefer to spend as little time as possible away from home. The target
income approach posits that migrants return when they accumulate enough savings to
reach particular, assumed in advance, level of lifetime income. Similarly to the life-cycle
view the target income perspective suggests that the length of time a migrant spends
in a destination country increases with higher migration costs and higher wages at the
origin. Conditioning return on the accumulation of a ﬁxed savings level implies as well
that duration of stay abroad decreases with wages at the origin. The conclusion that may
but not necessarily has to follow, when workers compare their marginal beneﬁts and costs
of staying in a foreign country before a return.
An alternative explanation of return migration is the correction of an earlier migration
decision, for example when a worker based emigration decision on erroneous information.
This intuitive explanation of returns is provided by Yezer and Thurston (1976), Allen
(1979) and Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). Information asymmetries are used to explain
return migration also in richer settings. Stark (1995) and Katz and Stark (1989) de-
velop the model where return migration occurs because employers learn about individual
productivity of individuals. Once symmetrical information is reinstated, the wage rate
of an immigrant is adjusted. The possible wage reduction may encourage a worker to
return. Importantly, the correction motive may contribute to an accentuation of a type
of self-selection characterizing immigrant population.
Consistently with both the life-cycle theory and correction hypothesis, re-migration
typically occurs soon after immigration. Moreover, labour market outcomes are important
determinants of return migration. Bellemare (2003, 2004), Constant and Massey (2003)
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report negative selection in terms of employment outcomes in return migration from
Germany.
The life-cycle perspective is supported by empirical evidence on the importance of
migration costs as determinants of the probability of return. Costs of entry into a foreign
market for undocumented immigrants are higher than for legal immigrants. Therefore
the former should have stronger incentives to stay longer in a host country in order to
accumulate more savings net of costs of entry. Reichert and Massey (1979) show that
undocumented migrants from Guadalupe were likely to stay in the U.S. for on average
three months longer than legal migrants. Along similar lines Reyes (2004) shows that
changes in the U.S. immigration policy had signiﬁcant impact on the average duration of
a trip of Mexican workers. The legalization of stay of part of actual immigrants shortened
the average duration of a trip of a Mexican worker. The construction of the wall at
the U.S.-Mexican border, in turn, lengthened it. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) document
signiﬁcant negative impact of a distance between the U.S. and a country of origin on the
probability of outmigration of a worker. Finally, using micro data for Germany, Dustmann
(2003) ﬁnds some support for the claim that migration duration might decrease if wage
diﬀerentials grow larger and a shorter stay is suﬃcient to cover migration costs.
Location preferences and/or price level diﬀerences between source and host economies
are reﬂected in a high share of return migrants who withdraw from the labour force.
Higher probability of non-employment of return migrants (from stayers) is conﬁrmed for
Mexican emigrants to the U.S. (Aleman-Castilla, 2007) and Albanian emigrants (Piracha
and Vadean, 2009). The alternative approach is to focus on return migration of the elderly
for whom cost of living and quality of life (local consumption preferences) are likely
to dominate wage diﬀerences considerations. Klinthall (2006) shows that the moment
of entering (oﬃcial) retirement age by immigrants in Sweden deﬁnes the peak of the
distribution of return probabilities by age (for workers between 51 and 80). Analyzing
data for immigrants to Australia Cobb-Clark and Stillman (2008) document that age-
retirement patterns of immigrants are consistent with their high emigration propensity at
the moment of reaching retirement age.
In accordance with the life-cycle hypothesis, the earlier a migrant enters a foreign
labour market and the longer she stays, the higher should be her accumulation of host
country speciﬁc experience and education and higher alternative costs of a return (Bor-
jas and Bratsberg, 1996, Massey and Espinoza, 1997). Return propensities of migrants
increase with the age at entry, but indeed decrease with the number of years of residence.
A migrant’s length of residence in a country reduces the likelihood that she will occasion-
ally return to her home country as shown by Nekby (2006) for immigrants in Sweden,
Bratsberg et al. (2007) in Norway and Jensen and Pedersen (2007) in Denmark. The
social context matters as well. The return migration usually occurs when a migrant does
not have a family in the host country.
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21 The role of returns to a foreign job experience is researched by Barrett and O’Connell
(2001). They estimate that Irish (male) return migrants earned around 10% more than
stayers, and the diﬀerence was by further 5 ppt. higher for those returnees who had
emigrated for job reasons. Iara (2006) and Martin and Radu (2008) ﬁnd some evidence
of positive returns to a foreign work experience in the Central and Eastern European
countries that entered the European Union in 2004. The latter work contains as well
a brief literature overview of earlier results on the wage premium of return migrants in
countries from the region.
The other strand of empirical literature veriﬁes the importance of ﬁnancial frictions
in source economies and migration as a strategy to overcome them. Lindstrom (1996)
documents positive relationship between duration of stay of Mexican migrants in the U.S.
and investment opportunities in an origin area. He interprets the outcomes as supporting
for a hypothesis that migrants stay longer to save more when the accumulated capital can
later be put to more productive use. Massey and Espinoza (1997) show that migrants
from more developed regions (regions with higher wages and share of working women)
tend to stay abroad for longer. Yang (2006) notices that a home currency depreciation
is likely to lead to earlier returns of middle income immigrants from Philippines and to
their higher investments in both productive and housing capital.
A number of studies focus on the propensity of former emigrants to become self-
employed. High propensity of return migrants to set up their own business might deliver
indirect support for the importance of migration decisions targeted at overcoming home
country capital market imperfections. Piracha and Vadean (2009) show that return mi-
grants to Albania are more likely than non-migrants to become entrepreneurs. Further,
Coulon and Piracha (2005) assess that 10% of returnees to Albania use their foreign
savings to set up a business. The probability that a returnee starts running a business
even increases after some time she spent at home (at the cost of decreasing propensity
to remain out of the labour force). Ilahi (1999) studies post-migration choices of return
migrants to Pakistan. He shows than return migrants who choose self-employment after
their return, had saved more than their peers when having been abroad. Ex post, accumu-
lated savings made self-employment a more beneﬁcial option for them than choice of paid
employment or a withdrawal from a labour force. McCormick and Wahba (2001) and
Wahba (2004) document similar patterns among Egyptian and Mesnard (2004) among
Tunesian returnees. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) indicate that a half of the Turk-
ish immigrants to Germany who returned in 1984 became active as entrepreneurs after
their return. Capital for starting oﬀ business stemmed from savings and capital acquired
abroad. Moreover, consistently with an attempt to start up the business at home, higher
earnings in the host country reduced migration duration of later entrepreneurs.
Important to notice, choice of self-employment might also reﬂect positive eﬀects of hu-
man capital accumulation by immigrants. Role of migration experience in the acquisition
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of business skills and ideas was emphasized by McCormick and Wahba (2001), Dustmann
and Kirchman (2002) and Piracha and Vadean (2009). In line with this argument, Coulon
and Piracha (2005) indicate that returns to foreign experience in Albania are the highest
in self-employment and managerial positions.
Finally, and corresponding with the correction hypothesis, tracing down Finnish in-
dividuals who migrated to Sweden, Rooth and Saarela (2007) conﬁrm that returns may
indeed strengthen selection mechanisms. While Finns moving to Sweden were negatively
selected from the source country population, the relatively best skilled come back most
frequently.
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5 Remittances
Remittances, here, are understood as all income transfers from migrants to their home
country, be they transfers to family members or repatriated savings. Interpersonal trans-
fers and repatriated savings are important element of the NEM and macro-grounded
theories of initiation and perpetuation of migration. Moreover, the NEM theory links
motives for remitting with return intentions (planned duration of stay). Therefore, con-
clusive tests on importance of particular motives underlying sending remittances serve
also a purpose of validation of diﬀerent migration theories and incentives to return to a
home country. Summary of motives described in the section is contained in Table 7.
In neoclassical macro models of migration remittances do not play any special role.
Remitting is closely tied to consumption smoothing and savings management. Migrants
remit income when expected return to home country investments in ﬁnancial or real assets
is higher than returns to alternative investments in other countries. As such, remitting
can be also tied to portfolio risk diﬀerentiation. Not far from the neoclassical arguments,
remittances may also represent payments for services (Cox, 1987) including taking care
of assets or family members in a source country. As such they are an element of trade
exchange between countries.
The NEM, focusing on a family instead of individuals, introduces a broader set of
motives to remit. These motives, ranging from self-interest to pure altruism, are tightly
coupled with forces driving migration itself. A self-interested individual who at some point
of life considers return may remit to demonstrate laudable behaviour and signal prestige.
If capital markets are incomplete, an individual can enter an implicit family contract to
ﬁnance migration or education. Such a contract combines elements of investment (in
migrant’s education, cost of migration) and repayment. Unless risks between sending
and foreign countries are perfectly correlated, a similar contract may co-insure family
members being abroad and staying at home. To be a viable explanation of remittances,
the family contracts have to be self-enforcing. Contracts enforcement may base on social
norms like reputation and ostracism or some degree of altruism. Finally, if an emigrant
aspires to inherit from her family members who stayed in a home country, stayers may
use their wealth to enforce desired behaviour of leavers. An altruistic migrant, in turn,
shares her income with stayers (Stark, 1999) simply because she cares about the welfare
of her family.
The other motive underlying sending of remittances proposed by Stark (1995) relies on
the desire of actual emigrants to dampen inﬂow of low skilled natives from their country
of origin to their country of actual residence. If host country employers statistically
discriminate between nativities of diﬀerent countries, an inﬂow of low-skilled individuals
might hamper employment chances or lower wages of earlier leavers from the region.
24
To forestall these developments earlier emigrants share their income with stayers. They
attempt to control via remittances a further outﬂows of workers from their home country
and indirectly inﬂuence the average productivity of peer natives at a host labour market.
25Remittances
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An overview of the empirical literature on economic determinants of remittances is
oﬀered by Rapoport and Docquier (2006) or Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007). When
not mentioned otherwise, I refer to conclusions from works included in these reviews.
Additionally, I augment them with references to some other (mostly newer or conducted
in a general equilibrium setting) studies.
Consistently with the most of motives for sending remittances mentioned in the lit-
erature, high economic activity in a host country and a good labour market situation of
an immigrant, are usually found to increase an amount of remittances sent to her source
country. Good investment climate, stable political and economic situation (reﬂected inter
alia in the stability of a local currency) in a home region are also often positively corre-
lated with inﬂow of remittances (Aydas et al., 2005, Catrinescu et al., 2009). However,
the importance of other portfolio variables including the interest rate diﬀerential and rel-
ative returns on real assets, is less supported by the data (Straubhaar, 1986, Schiopu and
Siegfried, 2006). In fact, lower volatility of remittances inﬂows as compared to other cap-
ital ﬂows, FDI or foreign aid, speak against prevalence of investment motives (Solimano,
2003, Salomone, 2006, Kukulenz and Buch, 2004).
Lucas and Stark (1985) gather evidence supporting relevance of the self-interest as a
motive underlying sending of remittances. They document that sons in Botswana remitted
more when their families were wealthier. Similar correlation is not present for emigrant
daughters who due to social reasons were less probable than to inherit. Hence, they
interpret the evidence as supporting for an inheritance motive. The inheritance motive
proved to be helpful in explaining dynamics of remittances to Western Kenya, Dominican
and Kosova (the last by Havolli, 2009). Elements of self-interest can also explain the
strong positive empirical relationship between the probability of remitting and the amount
of remitted income, and immigrants intention to return home.
The pure altruism hypothesis is usually rejected by the data. However, a certain de-
gree of altruism helps to explain observed dynamics of immigrants’ income transfers. On
a macro level, remittances are frequently found to be negatively correlated with the source
country business cycle (Bouhga-Hagbe, 2004, 2006). It indirectly indicate at the presence
of either altruistic or insurance motives. However, Sayan (2006), Durdu and Sayan (2010)
provide some evidence that the negative relationship between cyclical GDP ﬂuctuations
and inﬂow of remittances does not always hold. Micro evidence on the relationship be-
tween households’ income and the amount of remittances received are also mixed. A
negative relationship between the total number of migrants within the household and the
amount of remittances send by each of them, implied by the altruistic motive, cannot
usually be rejected. On the other hand, s diﬃcult economic situation of family members
or a high dependency ratio are found to be positively related to the amount of remit-
tances received by stayers only in some studies. Other authors ﬁnd a positive relationship
between recipients’ income and an amount of remittances received, which would speak
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rather for the self-interest motives.
Data frequently hold up with the family contracts hypothesis. The loan motive is
supported by evidence on a positive link between ﬁnancial help received by an emigrant
from her family and an amount of remittances sent back home by her later. Empirical im-
portance of risk aversion for initiating migration and ﬂuctuations in inﬂows of remittances
in response to income shocks to household in a source country, are in turn consistent with
insurance motives.
Monetary transfers distort a picture of emigration as aﬀecting a source region pre-
dominantly via labour supply channel. The following concerns apply: ﬁrst, recipients of
remittances may reduce their work eﬀort. Higher non-employment income and limited
emigrants’ monitoring possibilities give raise to a moral hazard problem on the side of
stayers. Remittances can allow non-migrant family members to extend duration of their
job search, limit their labour market activity or to get more involved in a household
production e.g. raising children. Kozel and Alderman (1990) provide some evidence on
importance of these channels for Pakistani and Cabegin (2006) for Filipino workers.
Second, in an environment with liquidity constraints remittances can be used for
investment purposes - both in physical and human capital. Taylor (1992) regresses a
household income on remittances controlling for an asset ownership and arrives at an
estimate of an income-remittances elasticity of 1.85. He interprets the high estimate of
elasticity as indication that a signiﬁcant portion of transferred resources is spend not on
consumption goods but on income-generating assets. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009)
analyze macro level relation between remittances and investments for a broad sample
of developing countries, and conclude that remittances can substitute for a presence of
ﬁnancial intermediaries. The more developed is the ﬁnancial sector, the lesser is the posi-
tive impact of inﬂow of remittances on investment activity, and consequently growth, in a
country. Along similar lines, Schrooten (2005) notices that those transition countries with
poorly functioning banking sector register the highest inﬂow of remittances. Thereby re-
mittances facilitate a catching-up process. Hanson and Woodruﬀ (2003) ﬁnd that children
in Mexican households with emigrants complete more years of schooling. Bredl (2010) ar-
rives at similar conclusions analysing data on Haitian households. Woodruﬀ and Zenteno
(2001) show that remittances are an important source for investments (ﬁnancing 20% of
investments in urban areas) in micro-enterprises in Mexico.
Remittances may as well shift an economy out of equilibrium, when higher purchasing
power of emigrants’ families is not met by a proportional increase in a supply of goods.
El-Sakka and McNaab (1999) argue that remittances could have shifted the Egyptian
economy out of equilibrium between 1967-1991 as they were used predominantly to ﬁnance
imports in line with very high income elasticity of imports. A great share of the literature
on macroeconomic consequences of remittances focuses however on their stabilizing eﬀects.
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rather for the self-interest motives.
Data frequently hold up with the family contracts hypothesis. The loan motive is
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in response to income shocks to household in a source country, are in turn consistent with
insurance motives.
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dominantly via labour supply channel. The following concerns apply: ﬁrst, recipients of
remittances may reduce their work eﬀort. Higher non-employment income and limited
emigrants’ monitoring possibilities give raise to a moral hazard problem on the side of
stayers. Remittances can allow non-migrant family members to extend duration of their
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production e.g. raising children. Kozel and Alderman (1990) provide some evidence on
importance of these channels for Pakistani and Cabegin (2006) for Filipino workers.
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investment purposes - both in physical and human capital. Taylor (1992) regresses a
household income on remittances controlling for an asset ownership and arrives at an
estimate of an income-remittances elasticity of 1.85. He interprets the high estimate of
elasticity as indication that a signiﬁcant portion of transferred resources is spend not on
consumption goods but on income-generating assets. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009)
analyze macro level relation between remittances and investments for a broad sample
of developing countries, and conclude that remittances can substitute for a presence of
ﬁnancial intermediaries. The more developed is the ﬁnancial sector, the lesser is the posi-
tive impact of inﬂow of remittances on investment activity, and consequently growth, in a
country. Along similar lines, Schrooten (2005) notices that those transition countries with
poorly functioning banking sector register the highest inﬂow of remittances. Thereby re-
mittances facilitate a catching-up process. Hanson and Woodruﬀ (2003) ﬁnd that children
in Mexican households with emigrants complete more years of schooling. Bredl (2010) ar-
rives at similar conclusions analysing data on Haitian households. Woodruﬀ and Zenteno
(2001) show that remittances are an important source for investments (ﬁnancing 20% of
investments in urban areas) in micro-enterprises in Mexico.
Remittances may as well shift an economy out of equilibrium, when higher purchasing
power of emigrants’ families is not met by a proportional increase in a supply of goods.
El-Sakka and McNaab (1999) argue that remittances could have shifted the Egyptian
economy out of equilibrium between 1967-1991 as they were used predominantly to ﬁnance
imports in line with very high income elasticity of imports. A great share of the literature
on macroeconomic consequences of remittances focuses however on their stabilizing eﬀects.
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As due to their relative robustness to degeneration of the investment climate, they are
expected to cushion the business cycle ﬂuctuations or protect an economy from an outﬂow
of investors’ capital in case of a crisis (Bugamelli and Paterno, 2009).
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6 Temporary migration
The key advantage of the microeconomic description of migration is its ability to nest
initiation of migration with motives for return migration and sending remittances. Neo-
classical theory is complex enough to explain both a permanent migration and a migration
eventually ended by a return to a home country. For instance, if skills acquired abroad
are expected to yield higher employment chances or income back at home, a worker may
decide at the outset to emigrate ﬁrst and return later. The approach can also comprehend
non-economic, social costs of migration (e.g. via introduction of a home bias in the utility
function). With this extension, the theory is able to answer its main criticism (moderate
magnitude of migration ﬂows in the world of high income disparities) and incorporate an
additional motive of return.
Motives underlying migration, according to the NEM, seem to facilitate predominantly
temporary labour movements. Explanations of migration referring to relative deprivation
assume that workers care about their status at home. This makes workers more benevolent
to remain at the bottom of income or prestige hierarchy in a foreign country. Their
motivation assumes a return once their wealth is suﬃcient to get higher status at home.
Migration driven by a limited access to capital also should terminate as soon as a worker
accumulates enough savings to set oﬀ a business in a home country. Along with the
co-insurance motive of migration, return is likely to appear when disutility tied to the
presence of a household member abroad is not compensated with a reduction of riskiness
of a household’s income.
Remittances in the NEM setting are tied either directly to willingness of a migrant
to return home (when money are send home to acquire a higher prestige or in a home
of getting inheritance) or to existence of interpersonal linkages between family members.
Even in the latter case, concern about relatives or situation at home may be thought to
correspond better with temporary than permanent character of migration.
Theories that perceive migration as a macroeconomic issue seem to lack the compre-
hensiveness of microeconomic approaches. They usually fail to explicitly tackle reasons
and consequences of return migration. Only the segmented labour market theory pins
down some elements of temporary migration.
Existing micro-level migration theories can accommodate attempted temporariness of
stays abroad and less so theories working on higher level of aggregation. Even the latter
would be only a minor problem, at least on a macro level, as long as temporary and
permanent migrants would behave suﬃciently similarly.
A few proposals were raised in the literature why temporary migrants may be indeed
diﬀerent from permanent migrants. They can:
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• exhibit diﬀerent savings behaviour11 (Galor and Stark, 1990, Dustmann, 1997a),
• exhibit diﬀerent remitting behaviour (Glystos, 1988, Sinning, 2007)
• behave diﬀerently on host labour markets (Galor and Stark, 1991, Dustmann,
1997b),
• pursue diﬀerent strategies in terms of investment in their human capital (Dustmann,
1993, 1999)
Intuitively, a return intention ties behaviour of migrant stronger to developments in
a home country. Galor and Stark (1990) argue that the intention to return to a country
of origin (where wages are lower) incentivizes temporary migrants to save more than
permanent migrants, in order to smooth their consumption over the life-cycle. Dustmann
(1997a) extends the argument and shows that savings of temporary migrants depend not
only on wage diﬀerentials between countries but also on risks in host- and home- country
labour markets (and correlation of labour market shocks). When labour market shocks
are uncorrelated temporary migrants may in fact save less than natives or permanent
migrants. It is so, because in case of situation on a host labour market turning bad,
temporary immigrants can simply terminate they stay.
Some diﬀerences in behaviour of two types of migrants are validated empirically. Bauer
and Sinning (2005, 2009) document that temporary immigrants in Western Germany
have a signiﬁcantly higher savings propensity than permanent migrants12. Above that
remittances represent a substantial part of savings of temporary migrants, while they
seem to have only a minor share in savings of permanent migrants. Temporary migrants
display higher propensity to save than permanent migrants (or natives), once remittances
are accounted for in their savings rate. Piracha and Zhu (2007) (who use the same German
Socio Economic Panel, GSOEP) do not distinguish between temporary and permanent
migrants. However, their results indicate that the reform in Germany targeted at easing
the naturalization of immigrants in 2000 signiﬁcantly reduced the level of precautionary
savings. To the degree to which the reform encouraged previous temporary migrants to
settle-down, the documented reduction of savings rate may be tied to lowering of the
share of immigrants intending to eventually leave the host country.
Dustmann and Mestres (2010) show (again on the basis of the GSOEP data) that
immigrants with return plans place a higher proportion of their savings in a home country.
11It should be however stated that diﬀerences in savings behaviour between temporary migrants, per-
manent migrants and natives may be linked not only directly to their diﬀerent migration plans but also
to their diﬀerent cultural or economic background as well as to their limited access to social welfare
programs (Bauer and Sinning, 2005).
12Earlier, but signiﬁcantly less conclusive evidence on savings of guestworkers in Germany was provided
by Merkle and Zimmermann (1992). They show that the immigrants usually had positive savings, either
kept in the host country or remitted.
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Intuitively, a return intention ties behaviour of migrant stronger to developments in
a home country. Galor and Stark (1990) argue that the intention to return to a country
of origin (where wages are lower) incentivizes temporary migrants to save more than
permanent migrants, in order to smooth their consumption over the life-cycle. Dustmann
(1997a) extends the argument and shows that savings of temporary migrants depend not
only on wage diﬀerentials between countries but also on risks in host- and home- country
labour markets (and correlation of labour market shocks). When labour market shocks
are uncorrelated temporary migrants may in fact save less than natives or permanent
migrants. It is so, because in case of situation on a host labour market turning bad,
temporary immigrants can simply terminate they stay.
Some diﬀerences in behaviour of two types of migrants are validated empirically. Bauer
and Sinning (2005, 2009) document that temporary immigrants in Western Germany
have a signiﬁcantly higher savings propensity than permanent migrants12. Above that
remittances represent a substantial part of savings of temporary migrants, while they
seem to have only a minor share in savings of permanent migrants. Temporary migrants
display higher propensity to save than permanent migrants (or natives), once remittances
are accounted for in their savings rate. Piracha and Zhu (2007) (who use the same German
Socio Economic Panel, GSOEP) do not distinguish between temporary and permanent
migrants. However, their results indicate that the reform in Germany targeted at easing
the naturalization of immigrants in 2000 signiﬁcantly reduced the level of precautionary
savings. To the degree to which the reform encouraged previous temporary migrants to
settle-down, the documented reduction of savings rate may be tied to lowering of the
share of immigrants intending to eventually leave the host country.
Dustmann and Mestres (2010) show (again on the basis of the GSOEP data) that
immigrants with return plans place a higher proportion of their savings in a home country.
11It should be however stated that diﬀerences in savings behaviour between temporary migrants, per-
manent migrants and natives may be linked not only directly to their diﬀerent migration plans but also
to their diﬀerent cultural or economic background as well as to their limited access to social welfare
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Also the absolute value of ﬁnancial and housing assets in a home country of immigrants
who consider their stay as temporary is larger than that of other foreign born workers.
Temporary migrants also hold less assets in a host country than permanent immigrants.
The authors do not conﬁrm results of Bauer and Sinning (2007, 2009) on diﬀerences in
saving propensity between temporary and permanent migrants.
Sinning (2007) indicates, using data on German migrants, that return intentions are
positively correlated on the probability of sending remittances as well as their amount.
On an example of Greek migration to Germany, Glytsos (1988) empirically distinguishes
temporary migrants, who are more likely to remit for investment and future consump-
tion smoothing purposes, and permanent, who are more frequently remit for altruistic
purposes.
Dustmann (1997b) ﬁnds that married, immigrant women in Germany, who wish to
return to their home country, more frequently participate in a local labour market (as in
the GSOEP data). An anticipated return increases their marginal utility of accumulated
wealth when they expect that economic situation in a home country may be relatively
unfavourable. Galor and Stark (1991) argue along similar lines, that temporary migrants
outperform natives at similar positions and with similar skills because they are better
motivated to save.
On the other hand, a shorter stay abroad may discourage migrants to bear too high
costs of investments into country-speciﬁc human capital. Dustmann (1993, 1999) evalu-
ates this hypothesis assessing a relationship between intended duration of stay and the
wage gap originating in deﬁciency of country speciﬁc skills, and in particular ﬂuency in
German (the GSOEP).
A picture of a temporary migrant emerging from theoretical arguments discussed in
the section, is a worker who works hard during her stay abroad and saves or remits home
a signiﬁcant share of her income. At the same time, she has less motivation to learn
a language, integrate or invest in her future career in a host country, than the average
permanent immigrant. These rather intuitive claims are generally supported by the data.
However, the clear weakness of the empirical evidence gathered on behaviour of temporary
immigrants is its strong reliance on the GSOEP data.
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temporary migrants, who are more likely to remit for investment and future consump-
tion smoothing purposes, and permanent, who are more frequently remit for altruistic
purposes.
Dustmann (1997b) ﬁnds that married, immigrant women in Germany, who wish to
return to their home country, more frequently participate in a local labour market (as in
the GSOEP data). An anticipated return increases their marginal utility of accumulated
wealth when they expect that economic situation in a home country may be relatively
unfavourable. Galor and Stark (1991) argue along similar lines, that temporary migrants
outperform natives at similar positions and with similar skills because they are better
motivated to save.
On the other hand, a shorter stay abroad may discourage migrants to bear too high
costs of investments into country-speciﬁc human capital. Dustmann (1993, 1999) evalu-
ates this hypothesis assessing a relationship between intended duration of stay and the
wage gap originating in deﬁciency of country speciﬁc skills, and in particular ﬂuency in
German (the GSOEP).
A picture of a temporary migrant emerging from theoretical arguments discussed in
the section, is a worker who works hard during her stay abroad and saves or remits home
a signiﬁcant share of her income. At the same time, she has less motivation to learn
a language, integrate or invest in her future career in a host country, than the average
permanent immigrant. These rather intuitive claims are generally supported by the data.
However, the clear weakness of the empirical evidence gathered on behaviour of temporary
immigrants is its strong reliance on the GSOEP data.
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7 Conclusions
The evidence gathered so far suggests that the issue of distinguishing temporary from
permanent migration is not only deﬁnitional. An attempt to return to a home coun-
try is likely be related to closer ties kept by immigrants with their family, friends and
labour market at home. Planned temporariness of a stay abroad can therefore impact
on migrants’ saving, remitting and labour market behaviour. That, in turn, may inﬂu-
ence patterns of adjustment of source and host economies to migration ﬂows or unrelated
macroeconomic shocks.
The empirical importance of temporary migration is not yet appropriately matched by
its theoretical description. On the positive side, general theories of international migra-
tion, even though they rarely explicitly separate temporary from permanent migration,
can quite well accommodate explanations of temporary stays abroad. It is particularly
true for the NEM theory which emphasizes the role of intra-family linkages between emi-
grants and stayers and existence of home-country based reference groups. The neoclassical
life-cycle perspective also provides motives of temporary stays abroad, e.g. when migra-
tion counts as a human capital investment with a payoﬀ after a return. On the other
hand, macroeconomic theories lack comprehensiveness of micro theories. If anything, by
silently assuming homogenous preferences of natives of diﬀerent countries (as the macro
neoclassical theory or international trade models), they seem to correspond closer with
permanent labour movements.
Then, are XXI century migrants more likely to act like temporary or permanent leavers
or settlers and what does it imply? What makes it diﬃcult to take a clear standing on the
interpretation of contemporary migration ﬂows is that empirical evidence on relevance of
diﬀerent hypothesis is not very telling. This state of aﬀairs partially reﬂects challenges
faced by empirical research including limited availability of data on migration. Scarce
data resources lead to over-representation of studies focusing on a particular migration
wave (e.g. German guest workers information from the GSOEP), taking particular time
perspective (heavily employed population census data have only decade frequency) or
applying methods that do not assure absence of signiﬁcant biases e.g. due to small
fractions of migrants in random population samples (surveys). Empirical evaluations of
theories are also scattered between separate studies on migration initialization, returns
or remittances. Studies taking a uniform, general view on interrelated phenomena tied to
labour cross-border movements, other than neoclassically grounded trade theory models,
are still largely missing.
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